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Napoleon enters Moscow after the brilliant victory de la Moskowa;
there can be no doubt about the victory for the battlefield remains
in the hands of the French. The Russians retreat and abandon their
ancient capital. Moscow, abounding in provisions, arms, munitions,
and incalculable wealth, is in Napoleon's hands. The Russian army,
only half the strength of the French, does not make a single attempt
to attack for a whole month. Napoleon's position is most brilliant.
He can either fall on the Russian army with double its strength
and destroy it; negotiate an advantageous peace, or in case of
a refusal make a menacing move on Petersburg, or even, in the
case of a reverse, return to Smolensk or Vilna; or remain in Moscow;
in short, no special genius would seem to be required to retain
the brilliant position the French held at that time. For that,
only very simple and easy steps were necessary: not to allow the
troops to loot, to prepare winter clothing- of which there was
sufficient in Moscow for the whole army- and methodically to collect
the provisions, of which (according to the French historians)
there were enough in Moscow to supply the whole army for six months.
Yet Napoleon, that greatest of all geniuses, who the historians
declare had control of the army, took none of these steps.
He not merely did nothing of the kind, but on the contrary
he used his power to select the most foolish and ruinous of all
the courses open to him. Of all that Napoleon might have done:
wintering in Moscow, advancing on Petersburg or on Nizhni-Novgorod,
or retiring by a more northerly or more southerly route (say by
the road Kutuzov afterwards took), nothing more stupid or disastrous
can be imagined than what he actually did. He remained in Moscow
till October, letting the troops plunder the city; then, hesitating
whether to leave a garrison behind him, he quitted Moscow, approached
Kutuzov without joining battle, turned to the right and reached
Malo-Yaroslavets, again without attempting to break through and
take the road Kutuzov took, but retiring instead to Mozhaysk along
the devastated Smolensk road. Nothing more stupid than that could
have been devised, or more disastrous for the army, as the sequel
showed. Had Napoleon's aim been to destroy his army, the most
skillful strategist could hardly have devised any series of actions
that would so completely have accomplished that purpose, independently
of anything the Russian army might do.
Napoleon, the man of genius, did this! But to say that he
destroyed his army because he wished to, or because he was very
stupid, would be as unjust as to say that he had brought his troops
to Moscow because he wished to and because he was very clever
and a genius.
In both cases his personal activity, having no more force
than the personal activity of any soldier, merely coincided with
the laws that guided the event.
The historians quite falsely represent Napoleon's faculties
as having weakened in Moscow, and do so only because the results
did not justify his actions. He employed all his ability and strength
to do the best he could for himself and his army, as he had done
previously and as he did subsequently in 1813. His activity at
that time was no less astounding than it was in Egypt, in Italy,
in Austria, and in Prussia. We do not know for certain in how
far his genius was genuine in Egypt- where forty centuries looked
down upon his grandeur- for his great exploits there are all told
us by Frenchmen. We cannot accurately estimate his genius in Austria
or Prussia, for we have to draw our information from French or
German sources, and the incomprehensible surrender of whole corps
without fighting and of fortresses without a siege must incline
Germans to recognize his genius as the only explanation of the
war carried on in Germany. But we, thank God, have no need to
recognize his genius in order to hide our shame. We have paid
for the right to look at the matter plainly and simply, and we
will not abandon that right.
His activity in Moscow was as amazing and as full of genius
as elsewhere. Order after order order and plan after plan were
issued by him from the time he entered Moscow till the time he
left it. The absence of citizens and of a deputation, and even
the burning of Moscow, did not disconcert him. He did not lose
sight either of the welfare of his army or of the doings of the
enemy, or of the welfare of the people of Russia, or of the direction
of affairs in Paris, or of diplomatic considerations concerning
the terms of the anticipated peace.
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