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Many historians say that the French did not win the battle
of Borodino because Napoleon had a cold, and that if he had not
had a cold the orders he gave before and during the battle would
have been still more full of genius and Russia would have been
lost and the face of the world have been changed. To historians
who believe that Russia was shaped by the will of one man- Peter
the Great- and that France from a republic became an empire and
French armies went to Russia at the will of one man- Napoleon-
to say that Russia remained a power because Napoleon had a bad
cold on the twenty-fourth of August may seem logical and convincing.
If it had depended on Napoleon's will to fight or not to fight
the battle of Borodino, and if this or that other arrangement
depended on his will, then evidently a cold affecting the manifestation
of his will might have saved Russia, and consequently the valet
who omitted to bring Napoleon his waterproof boots on the twenty-fourth
would have been the savior of Russia. Along that line of thought
such a deduction is indubitable, as indubitable as the deduction
Voltaire made in jest (without knowing what he was jesting at)
when he saw that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was due to Charles
IX's stomach being deranged. But to men who do not admit that
Russia was formed by the will of one man, Peter I, or that the
French Empire was formed and the war with Russia begun by the
will of one man, Napoleon, that argument seems not merely untrue
and irrational, but contrary to all human reality. To the question
of what causes historic events another answer presents itself,
namely, that the course of human events is predetermined from
on high- depends on the coincidence of the wills of all who take
part in the events, and that a Napoleon's influence on the course
of these events is purely external and fictitious.
Strange as at first glance it may seem to suppose that the
Massacre of St. Bartholomew was not due to Charles IX's will,
though he gave the order for it and thought it was done as a result
of that order; and strange as it may seem to suppose that the
slaughter of eighty thousand men at Borodino was not due to Napoleon's
will, though he ordered the commencement and conduct of the battle
and thought it was done because he ordered it; strange as these
suppositions appear, yet human dignity- which tells me that each
of us is, if not more at least not less a man than the great Napoleon-
demands the acceptance of that solution of the question, and historic
investigation abundantly confirms it.
At the battle of Borodino Napoleon shot at no one and killed
no one. That was all done by the soldiers. Therefore it was not
he who killed people.
The French soldiers went to kill and be killed at the battle
of Borodino not because of Napoleon's orders but by their own
volition. The whole army- French, Italian, German, Polish, and
Dutch- hungry, ragged, and weary of the campaign, felt at the
sight of an army blocking their road to Moscow that the wine was
drawn and must be drunk. Had Napoleon then forbidden them to fight
the Russians, they would have killed him and have proceeded to
fight the Russians because it was inevitable.
When they heard Napoleon's proclamation offering them, as
compensation for mutilation and death, the words of posterity
about their having been in the battle before Moscow, they cried
"Vive l'Empereur!" just as they had cried "Vive
l'Empereur!" at the sight of the portrait of the boy piercing
the terrestrial globe with a toy stick, and just as they would
have cried "Vive l'Empereur!" at any nonsense that might
be told them. There was nothing left for them to do but cry "Vive
l'Empereur!" and go to fight, in order to get food and rest
as conquerors in Moscow. So it was not because of Napoleon's commands
that they killed their fellow men.
And it was not Napoleon who directed the course of the battle,
for none of his orders were executed and during the battle he
did not know what was going on before him. So the way in which
these people killed one another was not decided by Napoleon's
will but occurred independently of him, in accord with the will
of hundreds of thousands of people who took part in the common
action. It only seemed to Napoleon that it all took place by his
will. And so the question whether he had or had not a cold has
no more historic interest than the cold of the least of the transport
soldiers.
Moreover, the assertion made by various writers that his cold
was the cause of his dispositions not being as well planned as
on former occasions, and of his orders during the battle not being
as good as previously, is quite baseless, which again shows that
Napoleon's cold on the twenty-sixth of August was unimportant.
The dispositions cited above are not at all worse, but are
even better, than previous dispositions by which he had won victories.
His pseudo-orders during the battle were also no worse than formerly,
but much the same as usual. These dispositions and orders only
seem worse than previous ones because the battle of Borodino was
the first Napoleon did not win. The profoundest and most excellent
dispositions and orders seem very bad, and every learned militarist
criticizes them with looks oks importance, when they relate to
a battle that has been lost, and the very worst dispositions and
orders seem very good, and serious people fill whole volumes to
demonstrate their merits, when they relate to a battle that has
been won.
The dispositions drawn up by Weyrother for the battle of Austerlitz
were a model of perfection for that kind of composition, but still
they were criticized- criticized for their very perfection, for
their excessive minuteness.
Napoleon at the battle of Borodino fulfilled his office as
representative of authority as well as, and even better than,
at other battles. He did nothing harmful to the progress of the
battle; he inclined to the most reasonable opinions, he made no
confusion, did not contradict himself, did not get frightened
or run away from the field of battle, but with his great tact
and military experience carried out his role of appearing to command,
calmly and with dignity.
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