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On the twenty-fifth of August, so his historians tell us,
Napoleon spent the whole day on horseback inspecting the locality,
considering plans submitted to him by his marshals, and personally
giving commands to his generals.
The original line of the Russian forces along the river Kolocha
had been dislocated by the capture of the Shevardino Redoubt on
the twenty-fourth, and part of the line- the left flank- had been
drawn back. That part of the line was not entrenched and in front
of it the ground was more open and level than elsewhere. It was
evident to anyone, military or not, that it was here the French
should attack. It would seem that not much consideration was needed
to reach this conclusion, nor any particular care or trouble on
the part of the Emperor and his marshals, nor was there any need
of that special and supreme quality called genius that people
are so apt to ascribe to Napoleon; yet the historians who described
the event later and the men who then surrounded Napoleon, and
he himself, thought otherwise.
Napoleon rode over the plain and surveyed the locality with
a profound air and in silence, nodded with approval or shook his
head dubiously, and without communicating to the generals around
him the profound course of ideas which guided his decisions merely
gave them his final conclusions in the form of commands. Having
listened to a suggestion from Davout, who was now called Prince
d'Eckmuhl, to turn the Russian left wing, Napoleon said it should
not be done, without explaining why not. To a proposal made by
General Campan (who was to attack the fleches) to lead his division
through the woods, Napoleon agreed, though the so-called Duke
of Elchingen (Ney) ventured to remark that a movement through
the woods was dangerous and might disorder the division.
Having inspected the country opposite the Shevardino Redoubt,
Napoleon pondered a little in silence and then indicated the spots
where two batteries should be set up by the morrow to act against
the Russian entrenchments, and the places where, in line with
them, the field artillery should be placed.
After giving these and other commands he returned to his tent,
and the dispositions for the battle were written down from his
dictation.
These dispositions, of which the French historians write with
enthusiasm and other historians with profound respect, were as
follows:
At dawn the two new batteries established during the night
on the plain occupied by the Prince d'Eckmuhl will open fire on
the opposing batteries of the enemy.
At the same time the commander of the artillery of the 1st
Corps, General Pernetti, with thirty cannon of Campan's division
and all the howitzers of Dessaix's and Friant's divisions, will
move forward, open fire, and overwhelm with shellfire the enemy's
battery, against which will operate:
24 guns of the artillery of the Guards
30 guns of Campan's division
and 8 guns of Friant's and Dessaix's divisions
--
in all 62 guns.
The commander of the artillery of the 3rd Corps, General Fouche,
will place the howitzers of the 3rd and 8th Corps, sixteen in
all, on the flanks of the battery that is to bombard the entrenchment
on the left, which will have forty guns in all directed against
it.
General Sorbier must be ready at the first order to advance
with all the howitzers of the Guard's artillery against either
one or other of the entrenchments.
During the cannonade Prince Poniatowski is to advance through
the wood on the village and turn the enemy's position.
General Campan will move through the wood to seize the first
fortification.
After the advance has begun in this manner, orders will be
given in accordance with the enemy's movements.
The cannonade on the left flank will begin as soon as the
guns of the right wing are heard. The sharpshooters of Morand's
division and of the vice-King's division will open a heavy fire
on seeing the attack commence on the right wing.
The vice-King will occupy the village and cross by its three
bridges, advancing to the same heights as Morand's and Gibrard's
divisions, which under his leadership will be directed against
the redoubt and come into line with the rest of the forces.
All this must be done in good order (le tout se fera avec
ordre et methode) as far as possible retaining troops in reserve.
The Imperial Camp near Mozhaysk,
September, 6, 1812.
These dispositions, which are very obscure and confused if
one allows oneself to regard the arrangements without religious
awe of his genius, related to Napoleon's orders to deal with four
points- four different orders. Not one of these was, or could
be, carried out.
In the disposition it is said first that the batteries placed
on the spot chosen by Napoleon, with the guns of Pernetti and
Fouche; which were to come in line with them, 102 guns in all,
were to open fire and shower shells on the Russian fleches and
redoubts. This could not be done, as from the spots selected by
Napoleon the projectiles did not carry to the Russian works, and
those 102 guns shot into the air until the nearest commander,
contrary to Napoleon's instructions, moved them forward.
The second order was that Poniatowski, moving to the village
through the wood, should turn the Russian left flank. This could
not be done and was not done, because Poniatowski, advancing on
the village through the wood, met Tuchkov there barring his way,
and could not and did not turn the Russian position.
The third order was: General Campan will move through the
wood to seize the first fortification. General Campan's division
did not seize the first fortification but was driven back, for
on emerging from the wood it had to reform under grapeshot, of
which Napoleon was unaware.
The fourth order was: The vice-King will occupy the village
(Borodino) and cross by its three bridges, advancing to the same
heights as Morand's and Gdrard's divisions (for whose movements
no directions are given), which under his leadership will be directed
against the redoubt and come into line with the rest of the forces.
As far as one can make out, not so much from this unintelligible
sentence as from the attempts the vice-King made to execute the
orders given him, he was to advance from the left through Borodino
to the redoubt while the divisions of Morand and Gerard were to
advance simultaneously from the front.
All this, like the other parts of the disposition, was not
and could not be executed. After passing through Borodino the
vice-King was driven back to the Kolocha and could get no farther;
while the divisions of Morand and Gerard did not take the redoubt
but were driven back, and the redoubt was only taken at the end
of the battle by the cavalry (a thing probably unforeseen and
not heard of by Napoleon). So not one of the orders in the disposition
was, or could be, executed. But in the disposition it is said
that, after the fight has commenced in this manner, orders will
be given in accordance with the enemy's movements, and so it might
be supposed that all necessary arrangements would be made by Napoleon
during the battle. But this was not and could not be done, for
during the whole battle Napoleon was so far away that, as appeared
later, he could not know the course of the battle and not one
of his orders during the fight could be executed.
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