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The movements of the Russian and French armies during the
campaign from Moscow back to the Niemen were like those in a game
of Russian blindman's bluff, in which two players are blindfolded
and one of them occasionally rings a little bell to inform the
catcher of his whereabouts. First he rings his bell fearlessly,
but when he gets into a tight place he runs away as quietly as
he can, and often thinking to escape runs straight into his opponent's
arms.
At first while they were still moving along the Kaluga road,
Napoleon's armies made their presence known, but later when they
reached the Smolensk road they ran holding the clapper of their
bell tight- and often thinking they were escaping ran right into
the Russians.
Owing to the rapidity of the French flight and the Russian
pursuit and the consequent exhaustion of the horses, the chief
means of approximately ascertaining the enemy's position- by cavalry
scouting- was not available. Besides, as a result of the frequent
and rapid change of position by each army, even what information
was obtained could not be delivered in time. If news was received
one day that the enemy had been in a certain position the day
before, by the third day when something could have been done,
that army was already two days' march farther on and in quite
another position.
One army fled and the other pursued. Beyond Smolensk there
were several different roads available for the French, and one
would have thought that during their stay of four days they might
have learned where the enemy was, might have arranged some more
advantageous plan and undertaken something new. But after a four
days' halt the mob, with no maneuvers or plans, again began running
along the beaten track, neither to the right nor to the left but
along the old- the worst- road, through Krasnoe and Orsha.
Expecting the enemy from behind and not in front, the French
separated in their flight and spread out over a distance of twenty-four
hours. In front of them all fled the Emperor, then the kings,
then the dukes. The Russian army, expecting Napoleon to take the
road to the right beyond the Dnieper- which was the only reasonable
thing for him to do- themselves turned to the right and came out
onto the highroad at Krasnoe. And here as in a game of blindman's
buff the French ran into our vanguard. Seeing their enemy unexpectedly
the French fell into confusion and stopped short from the sudden
fright, but then they resumed their flight, abandoning their comrades
who were farther behind. Then for three days separate portions
of the French army- first Murat's (the vice-king's), then Davout's,
and then Ney's- ran, as it were, the gauntlet of the Russian army.
They abandoned one another, abandoned all their heavy baggage,
their artillery, and half their men, and fled, getting past the
Russians by night by making semicircles to the right.
Ney, who came last, had been busying himself blowing up the
walls of Smolensk which were in nobody's way, because despite
the unfortunate plight of the French or because of it, they wished
to punish the floor against which they had hurt themselves. Ney,
who had had a corps of ten thousand men, reached Napoleon at Orsha
with only one thousand men left, having abandoned all the rest
and all his cannon, and having crossed the Dnieper at night by
stealth at a wooded spot.
From Orsha they fled farther along the road to Vilna, still
playing at blindman's buff with the pursuing army. At the Berezina
they again became disorganized, many were drowned and many surrendered,
but those who got across the river fled farther. Their supreme
chief donned a fur coat and, having seated himself in a sleigh,
galloped on alone, abandoning his companions. The others who could
do so drove away too, leaving those who could not to surrender
or die.
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