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From the time he received this news to the end of the campaign
all Kutuzov's activity was directed toward restraining his troops,
by authority, by guile, and by entreaty, from useless attacks,
maneuvers, or encounters with the perishing enemy. Dokhturov went
to Malo-Yaroslavets, but Kutuzov lingered with the main army and
gave orders for the evacuation of Kaluga- a retreat beyond which
town seemed to him quite possible.
Everywhere Kutuzov retreated, but the enemy without waiting
for his retreat fled in the opposite direction.
Napoleon's historians describe to us his skilled maneuvers
at Tarutino and Malo-Yaroslavets, and make conjectures as to what
would have happened had Napoleon been in time to penetrate into
the rich southern provinces.
But not to speak of the fact that nothing prevented him from
advancing into those southern provinces (for the Russian army
did not bar his way), the historians forget that nothing could
have saved his army, for then already it bore within itself the
germs of inevitable ruin. How could that army- which had found
abundant supplies in Moscow and had trampled them underfoot instead
of keeping them, and on arriving at Smolensk had looted provisions
instead of storing them- how could that army recuperate in Kaluga
province, which was inhabited by Russians such as those who lived
in Moscow, and where fire had the same property of consuming what
was set ablaze?
That army could not recover anywhere. Since the battle of
Borodino and the pillage of Moscow it had borne within itself,
as it were, the chemical elements of dissolution.
The members of what had once been an army- Napoleon himself
and all his soldiers fled- without knowing whither, each concerned
only to make his escape as quickly as possible from this position,
of the hopelessness of which they were all more or less vaguely
conscious.
So it came about that at the council at Malo-Yaroslavets,
when the generals pretending to confer together expressed various
opinions, all mouths were closed by the opinion uttered by the
simple-minded soldier Mouton who, speaking last, said what they
all felt: that the one thing needful was to get away as quickly
as possible; and no one, not even Napoleon, could say anything
against that truth which they all recognized.
But though they all realized that it was necessary to get
away, there still remained a feeling of shame at admitting that
they must flee. An external shock was needed to overcome that
shame, and this shock came in due time. It was what the French
called "le hourra de l'Empereur."
The day after the council at Malo-Yaroslavets Napoleon rode
out early in the morning amid the lines of his army with his suite
of marshals and an escort, on the pretext of inspecting the army
and the scene of the previous and of the impending battle. Some
Cossacks on the prowl for booty fell in with the Emperor and very
nearly captured him. If the Cossacks did not capture Napoleon
then, what saved him was the very thing that was destroying the
French army, the booty on which the Cossacks fell. Here as at
Tarutino they went after plunder, leaving the men. Disregarding
Napoleon they rushed after the plunder and Napoleon managed to
escape.
When les enfants du Don might so easily have taken the Emperor
himself in the midst of his army, it was clear that there was
nothing for it but to fly as fast as possible along the nearest,
familiar road. Napoleon with his forty-year-old stomach understood
that hint, not feeling his former agility and boldness, and under
the influence of the fright the Cossacks had given him he at once
agreed with Mouton and issued orders- as the historians tell us-
to retreat by the Smolensk road.
That Napoleon agreed with Mouton, and that the army retreated,
does not prove that Napoleon caused it to retreat, but that the
forces which influenced the whole army and directed it along the
Mozhaysk (that is, the Smolensk) road acted simultaneously on
him also.
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