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The Russian army was commanded by Kutuzov and his staff, and
also by the Emperor from Petersburg. Before the news of the abandonment
of Moscow had been received in Petersburg, a detailed plan of
the whole campaign had been drawn up and sent to Kutuzov for his
guidance. Though this plan had been drawn up on the supposition
that Moscow was still in our hands, it was approved by the staff
and accepted as a basis for action. Kutuzov only replied that
movements arranged from a distance were always difficult to execute.
So fresh instructions were sent for the solution of difficulties
that might be encountered, as well as fresh people who were to
watch Kutuzov's actions and report upon them.
Besides this, the whole staff of the Russian army was now
reorganized. The posts left vacant by Bagration, who had been
killed, and by Barclay, who had gone away in dudgeon, had to be
filled. Very serious consideration was given to the question whether
it would be better to put A in B's place and B in D's, or on the
contrary to put D in A's place, and so on- as if anything more
than A's or B's satisfaction depended on this.
As a result of the hostility between Kutuzov and Bennigsen,
his Chief of Staff, the presence of confidential representatives
of the Emperor, and these transfers, a more than usually complicated
play of parties was going on among the staff of the army. A was
undermining B, D was undermining C, and so on in all possible
combinations and permutations. In all these plottings the subject
of intrigue was generally the conduct of the war, which all these
men believed they were directing; but this affair of the war went
on independently of them, as it had to go: that is, never in the
way people devised, but flowing always from the essential attitude
of the masses. Only in the highest spheres did all these schemes,
crossings, and interminglings appear to be a true reflection of
what had to happen.
Prince Michael Ilarionovich! (wrote the Emperor on the second
of October in a letter that reached Kutuzov after the battle at
Tarutino) Since September 2 Moscow has been in the hands of the
enemy. Your last reports were written on the twentieth, and during
all this time not only has no action been taken against the enemy
or for the relief of the ancient capital, but according to your
last report you have even retreated farther. Serpukhov is already
occupied by an enemy detachment and Tula with its famous arsenal
so indispensable to the army, is in danger. From General Wintzingerode's
reports, I see that an enemy corps of ten thousand men is moving
on the Petersburg road. Another corps of several thousand men
is moving on Dmitrov. A third has advanced along the Vladimir
road, and a fourth, rather considerable detachment is stationed
between Ruza and Mozhaysk. Napoleon himself was in Moscow as late
as the twenty-fifth. In view of all this information, when the
enemy has scattered his forces in large detachments, and with
Napoleon and his Guards in Moscow, is it possible that the enemy's
forces confronting you are so considerable as not to allow of
your taking the offensive? On the contrary, he is probably pursuing
you with detachments, or at most with an army corps much weaker
than the army entrusted to you. It would seem that, availing yourself
of these circumstances, you might advantageously attack a weaker
one and annihilate him, or at least oblige him to retreat, retaining
in our hands an important part of the provinces now occupied by
the enemy, and thereby averting danger from Tula and other towns
in the interior. You will be responsible if the enemy is able
to direct a force of any size against Petersburg to threaten this
capital in which it has not been possible to retain many troops;
for with the army entrusted to you, and acting with resolution
and energy, you have ample means to avert this fresh calamity.
Remember that you have still to answer to our offended country
for the loss of Moscow. You have experienced my readiness to reward
you. That readiness will not weaken in me, but I and Russia have
a right to expect from you all the zeal, firmness, and success
which your intellect, military talent, and the courage of the
troops you command justify us in expecting.
But by the time this letter, which proved that the real relation
of the forces had already made itself felt in Petersburg, was
dispatched, Kutuzov had found himself unable any longer to restrain
the army he commanded from attacking and a battle had taken place.
On the second of October a Cossack, Shapovalov, who was out
scouting, killed one hare and wounded another. Following the wounded
hare he made his way far into the forest and came upon the left
flank of Murat's army, encamped there without any precautions.
The Cossack laughingly told his comrades how he had almost fallen
into the hands of the French. A cornet, hearing the story, informed
his commander.
The Cossack was sent for and questioned. The Cossack officers
wished to take advantage of this chance to capture some horses,
but one of the superior officers, who was acquainted with the
higher authorities, reported the incident to a general on the
staff. The state of things on the staff had of late been exceedingly
strained. Ermolov had been to see Bennigsen a few days previously
and had entreated him to use his influence with the commander
in chief to induce him to take the offensive.
"If I did not know you I should think you did not want
what you are asking for. I need only advise anything and his Highness
is sure to do the opposite," replied Bennigsen.
The Cossack's report, confirmed by horse patrols who were
sent out, was the final proof that events had matured. The tightly
coiled spring was released, the clock began to whirr and the chimes
to play. Despite all his supposed power, his intellect, his experience,
and his knowledge of men, Kutuzov- having taken into consideration
the Cossack's report, a note from Bennigsen who sent personal
reports to the Emperor, the wishes he supposed the Emperor to
hold, and the fact that all the generals expressed the same wish-
could no longer check the inevitable movement, and gave the order
to do what he regarded as useless and harmful- gave his approval,
that is, to the accomplished fact.
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