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Napoleon began the war with Russia because he could not resist
going to Dresden, could not help having his head turned by the
homage he received, could not help donning a Polish uniform and
yielding to the stimulating influence of a June morning, and could
not refrain from bursts of anger in the presence of Kurakin and
then of Balashev.
Alexander refused negotiations because he felt himself to
be personally insulted. Barclay de Tolly tried to command the
army in the best way, because he wished to fulfill his duty and
earn fame as a great commander. Rostov charged the French because
he could not restrain his wish for a gallop across a level field;
and in the same way the innumerable people who took part in the
war acted in accord with their personal characteristics, habits,
circumstances, and aims. They were moved by fear or vanity, rejoiced
or were indignant, reasoned, imagining that they knew what they
were doing and did it of their own free will, but they all were
involuntary tools of history, carrying on a work concealed from
them but comprehensible to us. Such is the inevitable fate of
men of action, and the higher they stand in the social hierarchy
the less are they free.
The actors of 1812 have long since left the stage, their personal
interests have vanished leaving no trace, and nothing remains
of that time but its historic results.
Providence compelled all these men, striving to attain personal
aims, to further the accomplishment of a stupendous result no
one of them at all expected- neither Napoleon, nor Alexander,
nor still less any of those who did the actual fighting.
The cause of the destruction of the French army in 1812 is
clear to us now. No one will deny that that cause was, on the
one hand, its advance into the heart of Russia late in the season
without any preparation for a winter campaign and, on the other,
the character given to the war by the burning of Russian towns
and the hatred of the foe this aroused among the Russian people.
But no one at the time foresaw (what now seems so evident) that
this was the only way an army of eight hundred thousand men- the
best in the world and led by the best general- could be destroyed
in conflict with a raw army of half its numerical strength, and
led by inexperienced commanders as the Russian army was. Not only
did no one see this, but on the Russian side every effort was
made to hinder the only thing that could save Russia, while on
the French side, despite Napoleon's experience and so-called military
genius, every effort was directed to pushing on to Moscow at the
end of the summer, that is, to doing the very thing that was bound
to lead to destruction.
In historical works on the year 1812 French writers are very
fond of saying that Napoleon felt the danger of extending his
line, that he sought a battle and that his marshals advised him
to stop at Smolensk, and of making similar statements to show
that the danger of the campaign was even then understood. Russian
authors are still fonder of telling us that from the commencement
of the campaign a Scythian war plan was adopted to lure Napoleon
into the depths of Russia, and this plan some of them attribute
to Pfuel, others to a certain Frenchman, others to Toll, and others
again to Alexander himself- pointing to notes, projects, and letters
which contain hints of such a line of action. But all these hints
at what happened, both from the French side and the Russian, are
advanced only because they fit in with the event. Had that event
not occurred these hints would have been forgotten, as we have
forgotten the thousands and millions of hints and expectations
to the contrary which were current then but have now been forgotten
because the event falsified them. There are always so many conjectures
as to the issue of any event that however it may end there will
always be people to say: "I said then that it
would be so," quite forgetting that amid their innumerable
conjectures many were to quite the contrary effect.
Conjectures as to Napoleon's awareness of the danger of extending
his line, and (on the Russian side) as to luring the enemy into
the depths of Russia, are evidently of that kind, and only by
much straining can historians attribute such conceptions to Napoleon
and his marshals, or such plans to the Russian commanders. All
the facts are in flat contradiction to such conjectures. During
the whole period of the war not only was there no wish on the
Russian side to draw the French into the heart of the country,
but from their first entry into Russia everything was done to
stop them. And not only was Napoleon not afraid to extend his
line, but he welcomed every step forward as a triumph and did
not seek battle as eagerly as in former campaigns, but very lazily.
At the very beginning of the war our armies were divided,
and our sole aim was to unite them, though uniting the armies
was no advantage if we meant to retire and lure the enemy into
the depths of the country. Our Emperor joined the army to encourage
it to defend every inch of Russian soil and not to retreat. The
enormous Drissa camp was formed on Pfuel's plan, and there was
no intention of retiring farther. The Emperor reproached the commanders
in chief for every step they retired. He could not bear the idea
of letting the enemy even reach Smolensk, still less could he
contemplate the burning of Moscow, and when our armies did unite
he was displeased that Smolensk was abandoned and burned without
a general engagement having been fought under its walls.
So thought the Emperor, and the Russian commanders and people
were still more provoked at the thought that our forces were retreating
into the depths of the country.
Napoleon having cut our armies apart advanced far into the
country and missed several chances of forcing an engagement. In
August he was at Smolensk and thought only of how to advance farther,
though as we now see that advance was evidently ruinous to him.
The facts clearly show that Napoleon did not foresee the danger
of the advance on Moscow, nor did Alexander and the Russian commanders
then think of luring Napoleon on, but quite the contrary. The
luring of Napoleon into the depths of the country was not the
result of any plan, for no one believed it to be possible; it
resulted from a most complex interplay of intrigues, aims, and
wishes among those who took part in the war and had no perception
whatever of the inevitable, or of the one way of saving Russia.
Everything came about fortuitously. The armies were divided at
the commencement of the campaign. We tried to unite them, with
the evident intention of giving battle and checking the enemy's
advance, and by this effort to unite them while avoiding battle
with a much stronger enemy, and necessarily withdrawing the armies
at an acute angle- we led the French on to Smolensk. But we withdrew
at an acute angle not only because the French advanced between
our two armies; the angle became still more acute and we withdrew
still farther, because Barclay de Tolly was an unpopular foreigner
disliked by Bagration (who would come his command), and Bagration-
being in command of the second army- tried to postpone joining
up and coming under Barclay's command as long as he could. Bagration
was slow in effecting the junction- though that was the chief
aim of all at headquarters- because, as he alleged, he exposed
his army to danger on this march, and it was best for him to retire
more to the left and more to the south, worrying the enemy from
flank and rear and securing from the Ukraine recruits for his
army; and it looks as if he planned this in order not to come
under the command of the detested foreigner Barclay, whose rank
was inferior to his own.
The Emperor was with the army to encourage it, but his presence
and ignorance of what steps to take, and the enormous number of
advisers and plans, destroyed the first army's energy and it retired.
The intention was to make a stand at the Drissa camp, but
Paulucci, aiming at becoming commander in chief, unexpectedly
employed his energy to influence Alexander, and Pfuel's whole
plan was abandoned and the command entrusted to Barclay. But as
Barclay did not inspire confidence his power was limited. The
armies were divided, there was no unity of command, and Barclay
was unpopular; but from this confusion, division, and the unpopularity
of the foreign commander in chief, there resulted on the one hand
indecision and the avoidance of a battle (which we could not have
refrained from had the armies been united and had someone else,
instead of Barclay, been in command) and on the other an ever-increasing
indignation against the foreigners and an increase in patriotic
zeal.
At last the Emperor left the army, and as the most convenient
and indeed the only pretext for his departure it was decided that
it was necessary for him to inspire the people in the capitals
and arouse the nation in general to a patriotic war. And by this
visit of the Emperor to Moscow the strength of the Russian army
was trebled.
He left in order not to obstruct the commander in chief's
undivided control of the army, and hoping that more decisive action
would then be taken, but the command of the armies became still
more confused and enfeebled. Bennigsen, the Tsarevich, and a swarm
of adjutants general remained with the army to keep the commander
in chief under observation and arouse his energy, and Barclay,
feeling less free than ever under the observation of all these
"eyes of the Emperor," became still more cautious of
undertaking any decisive action and avoided giving battle.
Barclay stood for caution. The Tsarevich hinted at treachery
and demanded a general engagement. Lubomirski, Bronnitski, Wlocki,
and the others of that group stirred up so much trouble that Barclay,
under pretext of sending papers to the Emperor, dispatched these
Polish adjutants general to Petersburg and plunged into an open
struggle with Bennigsen and the Tsarevich.
At Smolensk the armies at last reunited, much as Bagration
disliked it.
Bagration drove up in a carriage to to the house occupied
by Barclay. Barclay donned his sash and came out to meet and report
to his senior officer Bagration.
Despite his seniority in rank Bagration, in this contest of
magnanimity, took his orders from Barclay, but, having submitted,
agreed with him less than ever. By the Emperor's orders Bagration
reported direct to him. He wrote to Arakcheev, the Emperor's confidant:
"It must be as my sovereign pleases, but I cannot work with
the Minister (meaning Barclay). For God's sake send me somewhere
else if only in command of a regiment. I cannot stand it here.
Headquarters are so full of Germans that a Russian cannot exist
and there is no sense in anything. I thought I was really serving
my sovereign and the Fatherland, but it turns out that I am serving
Barclay. I confess I do not want to."
The swarm of Bronnitskis and Wintzingerodes and their like
still further embittered the relations between the commanders
in chief, and even less unity resulted. Preparations were made
to fight the French before Smolensk. A general was sent to survey
the position. This general, hating Barclay, rode to visit a friend
of his own, a corps commander, and, having spent the day with
him, returned to Barclay and condemned, as unsuitable from every
point of view, the battleground he had not seen.
While disputes and intrigues were going on about the future
field of battle, and while we were looking for the French- having
lost touch with them- the French stumbled upon Neverovski's division
and reached the walls of Smolensk.
It was necessary to fight an unexpected battle at Smolensk
to save our lines of communication. The battle was fought and
thousands were killed on both sides.
Smolensk was abandoned contrary to the wishes of the Emperor
and of the whole people. But Smolensk was burned by its own inhabitants-who
had been misled by their governor. And these ruined inhabitants,
setting an example to other Russians, went to Moscow thinking
only of their own losses but kindling hatred of the foe. Napoleon
advanced farther and we retired, thus arriving at the very result
which caused his destruction.
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