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On November 1 Kutuzov had received, through a spy, news that
the army he commanded was in an almost hopeless position. The
spy reported that the French, after crossing the bridge at Vienna,
were advancing in immense force upon Kutuzov's line of communication
with the troops that were arriving from Russia. If Kutuzov decided
to remain at Krems, Napoleon's army of one hundred and fifty thousand
men would cut him off completely and surround his exhausted army
of forty thousand, and he would find himself in the position of
Mack at Ulm. If Kutuzov decided to abandon the road connecting
him with the troops arriving from Russia, he would have to march
with no road into unknown parts of the Bohemian mountains, defending
himself against superior forces of the enemy and abandoning all
hope of a junction with Buxhowden. If Kutuzov decided to retreat
along the road from Krems to Olmutz, to unite with the troops
arriving from Russia, he risked being forestalled on that road
by the French who had crossed the Vienna bridge, and encumbered
by his baggage and transport, having to accept battle on the march
against an enemy three times as strong, who would hem him in from
two sides.
Kutuzov chose this latter course.
The French, the spy reported, having crossed the Vienna bridge,
were advancing by forced marches toward Znaim, which lay sixty-six
miles off on the line of Kutuzov's retreat. If he reached Znaim
before the French, there would be great hope of saving the army;
to let the French forestall him at Znaim meant the exposure of
his whole army to a disgrace such as that of Ulm, or to utter
destruction. But to forestall the French with his whole army was
impossible. The road for the French from Vienna to Znaim was shorter
and better than the road for the Russians from Krems to Znaim.
The night he received the news, Kutuzov sent Bagration's vanguard,
four thousand strong, to the right across the hills from the Krems-Znaim
to the Vienna-Znaim road. Bagration was to make this march without
resting, and to halt facing Vienna with Znaim to his rear, and
if he succeeded in forestalling the French he was to delay them
as long as possible. Kutuzov himself with all his transport took
the road to Znaim.
Marching thirty miles that stormy night across roadless hills,
with his hungry, ill-shod soldiers, and losing a third of his
men as stragglers by the way, Bagration came out on the Vienna-Znaim
road at Hollabrunn a few hours ahead of the French who were approaching
Hollabrunn from Vienna. Kutuzov with his transport had still to
march for some days before he could reach Znaim. Hence Bagration
with his four thousand hungry, exhausted men would have to detain
for days the whole enemy army that came upon him at Hollabrunn,
which was clearly impossible. But a freak of fate made the impossible
possible. The success of the trick that had placed the Vienna
bridge in the hands of the French without a fight led Murat to
try to deceive Kutuzov in a similar way. Meeting Bagration's weak
detachment on the Znaim road he supposed it to be Kutuzov's whole
army. To be able to crush it absolutely he awaited the arrival
of the rest of the troops who were on their way from Vienna, and
with this object offered a three days' truce on condition that
both armies should remain in position without moving. Murat declared
that negotiations for peace were already proceeding, and that
he therefore offered this truce to avoid unnecessary bloodshed.
Count Nostitz, the Austrian general occupying the advanced posts,
believed Murat's emissary and retired, leaving Bagration's division
exposed. Another emissary rode to the Russian line to announce
the peace negotiations and to offer the Russian army the three
days' truce. Bagration replied that he was not authorized either
to accept or refuse a truce and sent his adjutant to Kutuzov to
report the offer he had received.
A truce was Kutuzov's sole chance of gaining time, giving
Bagration's exhausted troops some rest, and letting the transport
and heavy convoys (whose movements were concealed from the French)
advance if but one stage nearer Znaim. The offer of a truce gave
the only, and a quite unexpected, chance of saving the army. On
receiving the news he immediately dispatched Adjutant General
Wintzingerode, who was in attendance on him, to the enemy camp.
Wintzingerode was not merely to agree to the truce but also to
offer terms of capitulation, and meanwhile Kutuzov sent his adjutants
back to hasten to the utmost the movements of the baggage trains
of the entire army along the Krems-Znaim road. Bagration's exhausted
and hungry detachment, which alone covered this movement of the
transport and of the whole army, had to remain stationary in face
of an enemy eight times as strong as itself.
Kutuzov's expectations that the proposals of capitulation
(which were in no way binding) might give time for part of the
transport to pass, and also that Murat's mistake would very soon
be discovered, proved correct. As soon as Bonaparte (who was at
Schonbrunn, sixteen miles from Hollabrunn) received Murat's dispatch
with the proposal of a truce and a capitulation, he detected a
ruse and wrote the following letter to Murat:
Schonbrunn, 25th Brumaire, 1805,
at eight o'clock in the morning
To PRINCE MURAT,
I cannot find words to express to you my displeasure. You
command only my advance guard, and have no right to arrange an
armistice without my order. You are causing me to lose the fruits
of a campaign. Break the armistice immediately and march on the
enemy. Inform him that the general who signed that capitulation
had no right to do so, and that no one but the Emperor of Russia
has that right.
If, however, the Emperor of Russia ratifies that convention,
I will ratify it; but it is only a trick. March on, destroy the
Russian army.... You are in a position to seize its baggage and
artillery.
The Russian Emperor's aide-de-camp is an impostor. Officers
are nothing when they have no powers; this one had none.... The
Austrians let themselves be tricked at the crossing of the Vienna
bridge, you are letting yourself be tricked by an aide-de-camp
of the Emperor.
NAPOLEON
Bonaparte's adjutant rode full gallop with this menacing letter
to Murat. Bonaparte himself, not trusting to his generals, moved
with all the Guards to the field of battle, afraid of letting
a ready victim escape, and Bagration's four thousand men merrily
lighted campfires, dried and warmed themselves, cooked their porridge
for the first time for three days, and not one of them knew or
imagined what was in store for him.
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