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Prince Andrew reached the general headquarters of the army
at the end of June. The first army, with which was the Emperor,
occupied the fortified camp at Drissa; the second army was retreating,
trying to effect a junction with the first one from which it was
said to be cut off by large French forces. Everyone was dissatisfied
with the general course of affairs in the Russian army, but no
one anticipated any danger of invasion of the Russian provinces,
and no one thought the war would extend farther than the western,
the Polish, provinces.
Prince Andrew found Barclay de Tolly, to whom he had been
assigned, on the bank of the Drissa. As there was not a single
town or large village in the vicinity of the camp, the immense
number of generals and courtiers accompanying the army were living
in the best houses of the villages on both sides of the river,
over a radius of six miles. Barclay de Tolly was quartered nearly
three miles from the Emperor. He received Bolkonski stiffly and
coldly and told him in his foreign accent that he would mention
him to the Emperor for a decision as to his employment, but asked
him meanwhile to remain on his staff. Anatole Kuragin, whom Prince
Andrew had hoped to find with the army, was not there. He had
gone to Petersburg, but Prince Andrew was glad to hear this. His
mind was occupied by the interests of the center that was conducting
a gigantic war, and he was glad to be free for a while from the
distraction caused by the thought of Kuragin. During the first
four days, while no duties were required of him, Prince Andrew
rode round the whole fortified camp and, by the aid of his own
knowledge and by talks with experts, tried to form a definite
opinion about it. But the question whether the camp was advantageous
or disadvantageous remained for him undecided. Already from his
military experience and what he had seen in the Austrian campaign,
he had come to the conclusion that in war the most deeply considered
plans have no significance and that all depends on the way unexpected
movements of the enemy- that cannot be foreseen- are met, and
on how and by whom the whole matter is handled. To clear up this
last point for himself, Prince Andrew, utilizing his position
and acquaintances, tried to fathom the character of the control
of the army and of the men and parties engaged in it, and he deduced
for himself the following of the state of affairs.
While the Emperor had still been at Vilna, the forces had
been divided into three armies. First, the army under Barclay
de Tolly, secondly, the army under Bagration, and thirdly, the
one commanded by Tormasov. The Emperor was with the first army,
but not as commander in chief. In the orders issued it was stated,
not that the Emperor would take command, but only that he would
be with the army. The Emperor, moreover, had with him not a commander
in chief's staff but the imperial headquarters staff. In attendance
on him was the head of the imperial staff, Quartermaster General
Prince Volkonski, as well as generals, imperial aides-de-camp,
diplomatic officials, and a large number of foreigners, but not
the army staff. Besides these, there were in attendance on the
Emperor without any definite appointments: Arakcheev, the ex-Minister
of War; Count Bennigsen, the senior general in rank; the Grand
Duke Tsarevich Constantine Pavlovich; Count Rumyantsev, the Chancellor;
Stein, a former Prussian minister; Armfeldt, a Swedish general;
Pfuel, the chief author of the plan of campaign; Paulucci, an
adjutant general and Sardinian emigre; Wolzogen- and many others.
Though these men had no military appointment in the army, their
position gave them influence, and often a corps commander, or
even the commander in chief, did not know in what capacity he
was questioned by Bennigsen, the Grand Duke, Arakcheev, or Prince
Volkonski, or was given this or that advice and did not know whether
a certain order received in the form of advice emanated from the
man who gave it or from the Emperor and whether it had to be executed
or not. But this was only the external condition; the essential
significance of the presence of the Emperor and of all these people,
from a courtier's point of view (and in an Emperor's vicinity
all became courtiers), was clear to everyone. It was this: the
Emperor did not assume the title of commander in chief, but disposed
of all the armies; the men around him were his assistants. Arakcheev
was a faithful custodian to enforce order and acted as the sovereign's
bodyguard. Bennigsen was a landlord in the Vilna province who
appeared to be doing the honors of the district, but was in reality
a good general, useful as an adviser and ready at hand to replace
Barclay. The Grand Duke was there because it suited him to be.
The ex-Minister Stein was there because his advice was useful
and the Emperor Alexander held him in high esteem personally.
Armfeldt virulently hated Napoleon and was a general full of self-confidence,
a quality that always influenced Alexander. Paulucci was there
because he was bold and decided in speech. The adjutants general
were there because they always accompanied the Emperor, and lastly
and chiefly Pfuel was there because he had drawn up the plan of
campaign against Napoleon and, having induced Alexander to believe
in the efficacy of that plan, was directing the whole business
of the war. With Pfuel was Wolzogen, who expressed Pfuel's thoughts
in a more comprehensible way than Pfuel himself (who was a harsh,
bookish theorist, self-confident to the point of despising everyone
else) was able to do.
Besides these Russians and foreigners who propounded new and
unexpected ideas every day- especially the foreigners, who did
so with a boldness characteristic of people employed in a country
not their own- there were many secondary personages accompanying
the army because their principals were there.
Among the opinions and voices in this immense, restless, brilliant,
and proud sphere, Prince Andrew noticed the following sharply
defined subdivisions of and parties:
The first party consisted of Pfuel and his adherents- military
theorists who believed in a science of war with immutable laws-
laws of oblique movements, outflankings, and so forth. Pfuel and
his adherents demanded a retirement into the depths of the country
in accordance with precise laws defined by a pseudo-theory of
war, and they saw only barbarism, ignorance, or evil intention
in every deviation from that theory. To this party belonged the
foreign nobles, Wolzogen, Wintzingerode, and others, chiefly Germans.
The second party was directly opposed to the first; one extreme,
as always happens, was met by representatives of the other. The
members of this party were those who had demanded an advance from
Vilna into Poland and freedom from all prearranged plans. Besides
being advocates of bold action, this section also represented
nationalism, which made them still more one-sided in the dispute.
They were Russians: Bagration, Ermolov (who was beginning to come
to the front), and others. At that time a famous joke of Ermolov's
was being circulated, that as a great favor he had petitioned
the Emperor to make him a German. The men of that party, remembering
Suvorov, said that what one had to do was not to reason, or stick
pins into maps, but to fight, beat the enemy, keep him out of
Russia, and not let the army get discouraged.
To the third party- in which the Emperor had most confidence-
belonged the courtiers who tried to arrange compromises between
the other two. The members of this party, chiefly civilians and
to whom Arakcheev belonged, thought and said what men who have
no convictions but wish to seem to have some generally say. They
said that undoubtedly war, particularly against such a genius
as Bonaparte (they called him Bonaparte now), needs most deeply
devised plans and profound scientific knowledge and in that respect
Pfuel was a genius, but at the same time it had to be acknowledged
that the theorists are often one sided, and therefore one should
not trust them absolutely, but should also listen to what Pfuel's
opponents and practical men of experience in warfare had to say,
and then choose a middle course. They insisted on the retention
of the camp at Drissa, according to Pfuel's plan, but on changing
the movements of the other armies. Though, by this course, neither
one aim nor the other could be attained, yet it seemed best to
the adherents of this third party.
Of a fourth opinion the most conspicuous representative was
the Tsarevich, who could not forget his disillusionment at Austerlitz,
where he had ridden out at the head of the Guards, in his casque
and cavalry uniform as to a review, expecting to crush the French
gallantly; but unexpectedly finding himself in the front line
had narrowly escaped amid the general confusion. The men of this
party had both the quality and the defect of frankness in their
opinions. They feared Napoleon, recognized his strength and their
own weakness, and frankly said so. They said: "Nothing but
sorrow, shame, and ruin will come of all this! We have abandoned
Vilna and Vitebsk and shall abandon Drissa. The only reasonable
thing left to do is to conclude peace as soon as possible, before
we are turned out of Petersburg."
This view was very general in the upper army circles and found
support also in Petersburg and from the chancellor, Rumyantsev,
who, for other reasons of state, was in favor of peace.
The fifth party consisted of those who were adherents of Barclay
de Tolly, not so much as a man but as minister of war and commander
in chief. "Be he what he may" (they always began like
that), "he is an honest, practical man and we have nobody
better. Give him real power, for war cannot be conducted successfully
without unity of command, and he will show what he can do, as
he did in Finland. If our army is well organized and strong and
has withdrawn to Drissa without suffering any defeats, we owe
this entirely to Barclay. If Barclay is now to be superseded by
Bennigsen all will be lost, for Bennigsen showed his incapacity
already in 1807."
The sixth party, the Bennigsenites, said, on the contrary,
that at any rate there was no one more active and experienced
than Bennigsen: "and twist about as you may, you will have
to come to Bennigsen eventually. Let the others make mistakes
now!" said they, arguing that our retirement to Drissa was
a most shameful reverse and an unbroken series of blunders. "The
more mistakes that are made the better. It will at any rate be
understood all the sooner that things cannot go on like this.
What is wanted is not some Barclay or other, but a man like Bennigsen,
who made his mark in 1807, and to whom Napoleon himself did justice-
a man whose authority would be willingly recognized, and Bennigsen
is the only such man."
The seventh party consisted of the sort of people who are
always to be found, especially around young sovereigns, and of
whom there were particularly many round Alexander- generals and
imperial aides-de-camp passionately devoted to the Emperor, not
merely as a monarch but as a man, adoring him sincerely and disinterestedly,
as Rostov had done in 1805, and who saw in him not only all the
virtues but all human capabilities as well. These men, though
enchanted with the sovereign for refusing the command of the army,
yet blamed him for such excessive modesty, and only desired and
insisted that their adored sovereign should abandon his diffidence
and openly announce that he would place himself at the head of
the army, gather round him a commander in chief's staff, and,
consulting experienced theoreticians and practical men where necessary,
would himself lead the troops, whose spirits would thereby be
raised to the highest pitch.
The eighth and largest group, which in its enormous numbers
was to the others as ninety-nine to one, consisted of men who
desired neither peace nor war, neither an advance nor a defensive
camp at the Drissa or anywhere else, neither Barclay nor the Emperor,
neither Pfuel nor Bennigsen, but only the one most essential thing-
as much advantage and pleasure for themselves as possible. In
the troubled waters of conflicting and intersecting intrigues
that eddied about the Emperor's headquarters, it was possible
to succeed in many ways unthinkable at other times. A man who
simply wished to retain his lucrative post would today agree with
Pfuel, tomorrow with his opponent, and the day after, merely to
avoid responsibility or to please the Emperor, would declare that
he had no opinion at all on the matter. Another who wished to
gain some advantage would attract the Emperor's attention by loudly
advocating the very thing the Emperor had hinted at the day before,
and would dispute and shout at the council, beating his breast
and challenging those who did not agree with him to duels, thereby
proving that he was prepared to sacrifice himself for the common
good. A third, in the absence of opponents, between two councils
would simply solicit a special gratuity for his faithful services,
well knowing that at that moment people would be too busy to refuse
him. A fourth while seemingly overwhelmed with work would often
come accidentally under the Emperor's eye. A fifth, to achieve
his long-cherished aim of dining with the Emperor, would stubbornly
insist on the correctness or falsity of some newly emerging opinion
and for this object would produce arguments more or less forcible
and correct.
All the men of this party were fishing for rubles, decorations,
and promotions, and in this pursuit watched only the weathercock
of imperial favor, and directly they noticed it turning in any
direction, this whole drone population of the army began blowing
hard that way, so that it was all the harder for the Emperor to
turn it elsewhere. Amid the uncertainties of the position, with
the menace of serious danger giving a peculiarly threatening character
to everything, amid this vortex of intrigue, egotism, conflict
of views and feelings, and the diversity of race among these people-
this eighth and largest party of those preoccupied with personal
interests imparted great confusion and obscurity to the common
task. Whatever question arose, a swarm of these drones, without
having finished their buzzing on a previous theme, flew over to
the new one and by their hum drowned and obscured the voices of
those who were disputing honestly.
From among all these parties, just at the time Prince Andrew
reached the army, another, a ninth party, was being formed and
was beginning to raise its voice. This was the party of the elders,
reasonable men experienced and capable in state affairs, who,
without sharing any of those conflicting opinions, were able to
take a detached view of what was going on at the staff at headquarters
and to consider means of escape from this muddle, indecision,
intricacy, and weakness.
The men of this party said and thought that what was wrong
resulted chiefly from the Emperor's presence in the army with
his military court and from the consequent presence there of an
indefinite, conditional, and unsteady fluctuation of relations,
which is in place at court but harmful in an army; that a sovereign
should reign but not command the army, and that the only way out
of the position would be for the Emperor and his court to leave
the army; that the mere presence of the Emperor paralyzed the
action of fifty thousand men required to secure his personal safety,
and that the worst commander in chief if independent would be
better than the very best one trammeled by the presence and authority
of the monarch.
Just at the time Prince Andrew was living unoccupied at Drissa,
Shishkov, the Secretary of State and one of the chief representatives
of this party, wrote a letter to the Emperor which Arakcheev and
Balashev agreed to sign. In this letter, availing himself of permission
given him by the Emperor to discuss the general course of affairs,
he respectfully suggested- on the plea that it was necessary for
the sovereign to arouse a warlike spirit in the people of the
capital- that the Emperor should leave the army.
That arousing of the people by their sovereign and his call
to them to defend their country- the very incitement which was
the chief cause of Russia's triumph in so far as it was produced
by the Tsar's personal presence in Moscow- was suggested to the
Emperor, and accepted by him, as a pretext for quitting the army.
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